Abstract: Novel approaches for dynamic information flow monitoring are promising since they enable permissive (accepting a large subset of executions) yet sound (rejecting all unsecure executions) enforcement of non-interference. In this paper, we present a dynamic information flow monitor for a language supporting pointers. Our flow-sensitive monitor relies on prior static analysis in order to soundly enforce non-interference. We also propose a program transformation that preserves the behavior of initial programs and soundly inlines our security monitor. This program transformation enables both dynamic and static verification of non-interference. Transformation de programmes pour la vérification de la non-interférence de programmes utilisant des pointeurs Résumé : De nouvelles techniques pour le suivi dynamique de flux d'information sont prometteuses en cela qu'elles acceptent plus d'exécution que des techniques purement statiques tout en restant sûres d'utilisation (elles rejettent toute exécution qui ne vérifierait pas la propriété de noninterférence). Dans ce rapport nous présentons un moniteur dynamique de flux d'information pour un langage supportant des pointeurs. Notre moniteur est sensible aux flots de données et se base sur une analyse statique préalable afin d'assurer de manière correcte la propriété de non-interférence. Nous proposons par ailleurs une transformation de programme qui préserve la sémantique du programme initial, tout en tissant le moniteur de suivi de flux au sein du programme transformé. Ce programme transformé peut être soit exécuté, le moniteur garantissant alors le respect de la propriété de non-interférence durant l'exécution, ou bien encore être analysé statiquement à son tour pour s'assurer que toutes ses exécutions préservent cette même propriété.
Transformation de programmes pour la vérification de la non-interférence de programmes utilisant des pointeurs 1 Introduction
Information security is usually enforced through access control which only enforces security policies at access time. On the contrary, information flow control (IFC) ensures that propagation of information inside a program does not breach neither confidentiality nor integrity.
The seminal work in IFC is initiated by Denning and Denning [1] . They proposed a static analysis to verify that information is propagated inside programs securely with respect to a flow policy. For instance, a simple flow policy disallows leakage of secret variables into public ones, hence ensuring confidentiality. This notion is generalized by Goguen and Meseguer [2] as noninterference. Non-interference, precisely its termination-insensitive formulation (TINI), has been widely adopted in IFC as a security policy [3, 4, 5] . Informally, it states that, when changing only secret inputs, terminating executions of a program must deliver the same public outputs.
Volpano et al. [3] formalize a Denning-style static analysis as a type system for a simple imperative language. Volpano's work provides the first soundness proof stating that a typable program is secure with respect to TINI. However, Volpano's type system lacks flow-sensitivity since security labels associated to variables are not allowed to change during analysis. For example, the program public = secret; public = 0 is secure because the final content of variable public is overridden. Still, this program is not typable by Volpano's type system because of flow-insensitivity.
Hunt and Sands [6] extend Volpano's type system with flow-sensitivity, hence permitting security labels to change in order to reflect the precise security level of their contents. Introducing flow-sensitivity to security type systems contributes to more permissive security analyses. Hunt and Sands prove the soundness of their type system with respect to TINI, while typing a larger subset of secure programs in comparison with Volpano's type system. Dynamic monitoring of information flows is also known to provide more permissiveness [7, 5] (accepting a large subset of executions). Unlike static analyses which enforce TINI for all possible execution paths, dynamic monitoring ensures that a single execution path is secure. However, permissiveness through the combination of both dynamic monitoring and flow-sensitivity requires careful examination. Indeed, Russo and Sabelfeld [5] prove that flow-sensitivity in purely dynamic IFC introduces covert channels leaking information. The main idea behind this result is that a purely dynamic monitor ignores non-executed conditional branches, missing at the same time information flows they produce. Therefore, a flow-sensitive dynamic monitor must rely on static analyses for sound (rejecting all unsecure executions) IFC.
Contributions.
In this paper, we investigate permissive yet sound flow-sensitive IFC for programs handling pointers. Our contributions are:
• We formalize a hybrid information flow monitor for an imperative language with pointers and aliasing, by relying on a semantics built upon the Clight [8] semantics. This semantics is especially used in the CompCert [9] provably correct compiler. We prove the soundness of our monitor with respect to TINI.
• We also propose a sound program transformation which inlines our information flow monitor. For languages that are compiled directly into native machine code as is the case for the C language, inlining is necessary to ensure fine-grained information flow monitoring. To our knowledge, our program transformation is the first proven sound inlining approach for dynamic monitors handling pointers.
• Assuming the implementation of security labels and their join operator, TINI can be enforced by running the self-monitoring transformed program. This dynamic approach
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has the advantage of being permissive since it soundly monitors a single execution path, ignoring possible unsecure paths that are not executed. The program transformation T also enables the verification of TINI by static analysis for free. Such a static approach computes an over-approximation of the transformed program semantics, enforcing TINI for all execution paths.
Outline. Section 2 introduces information flow background. Section 3 formalizes our information flow monitor for a simple imperative language handling pointers and aliasing. Section 4 defines a program transformation inlining our information flow monitor. We discuss related work in Section 5 and future work in Section 6.
Background
Non-interference. Our attacker model assumes that attackers know the source code of analyzed programs. It also supposes that attackers can only modify public inputs and read public outputs. A program is non-interferent if two terminating executions which differ only on secret inputs deliver the same public outputs. This notion of non-interference [2] formalizes independence of public outputs from secret inputs.
Information flows.
Explicit and implicit flows [1] are generally taken into account when enforcing TINI. Explicit flows are produced from any source variable y assigned to a destination variable x. Implicit flows are produced whenever an affectation occurs in conditional branches. For instance, the following program if (secret) x = 1 else skip generates an implicit flow from secret to x, whatever the executed branch is. Even if x is not assigned, an attacker could learn that secret is false if x is different from 1. As one generally enforces a sound approximation of TINI, we suppose that assignments inside conditionals always produce implicit flows from the guards to assigned variables. Additional information flows arise in the presence of pointers. Consider for example, the program if (secret) {x = &a} else {x = &b} print * x. An attacker, knowing the initial values of a and b, may learn information about the value of variable secret whenever * x is output : there is an information flow from secret to * x. There are actually two different kinds of information flows involved in this case. The first one is an implicit flow from secret to x because of assignments inside a conditional depending on secret. The second one, due to pointer aliasing and dereferencing, is from x to * x. Thus, by transitivity, there is an information flow from secret to x.
Similarly, the program if (secret) {x = &a} else {x = &b} * x = 1 exposes pointer-induced flows from secret to variables a and b. An attacker having access to either variables a or b after the assignment * x = 1, may learn information about variable secret. It is worth noting that even if a (resp. b) is not assigned by instruction * x = 1, an information flow from secret to a (resp. b) is still produced. In fact, this pointer-induced information flow involves all variables that could have been written by * x = 1 (here, both variables a and b).
As we are aiming at enforcing TINI, we ignore in this paper all covert channels due to diverging runs and timing channels. Hence, a program like while (secret) skip; could leak information about variable secret. Yet, this is acceptable since even in the presence of outputs, Askarov et al. [4] have proved that an attacker could not know the secret in polynomial time in the size of the secret. In order to extend Clight's three judgment rules with the information flow monitor semantics, we consider a lattice S = (SC, ) where public ∈ SC is the minimal element of S. We note the associated join operator. We also consider a new kind of memory Γ : Loc S, which maps locations to security labels. Informally, security memory Γ tracks the security level of locations content through tainting. For example, an assignment x = y + z generates an information flow from y and z to x. Thus, Γ maps to E(x) (i.e. the location associated to x) the security label Γ(E(y)) Γ(E(z)).
Expressions. Both Clight's r-value and l-value evaluations of expressions are extended to support the propagation of security labels, as illustrated in Figure 3 : the evaluation of expressions yields both a value v ∈ V and a security label s ∈ S. If the pair (l, s l ) is the result of l-value evaluation of expression a, then the security label s l captures pointer-induced flows produced by possible dereferences occurring in a, whereas s r = Γ(l) captures explicit flows produced by reading the value M (l) of a. Therefore, the r-value evaluation of a produces a value v = M (l) and a security label s = s l s r taking into account both explicit and pointer-induced flows through the join operator (rule RV ). Note that the semantics of Clight expressions can be obtained from Figure 3 by ignoring all the monitor related operations.
The security label associated to the r-value of a defines the label associated to the l-value of * a (rule LV M EM ), hence taking into account the pointer-induced information flow from a to * a. R-values of constants are labeled as public because attackers are supposed to know the source code. Since the locations of variables are at known offsets from the base pointer, we associate public to the l-values of variables (rule LV ID ). The label of the l-value of a defines the label associated to the r-value of &a (rule RV REF ). The security label associated to the r-value of a is propagated to the r-value of uop a (rule RV U OP ). Likewise, the security label associated to the r-value of a 1 bop a 2 takes into account both a 1 and a 2 r-values security labels through the join operator. Figure 4 illustrates an example of the r-value evaluation of * x. Supposing that x is stored at location l x and points to a variable a stored at location l a , the r-value evaluation of * x takes into account both pointer-induced and explicit flows since both s x (the security label of x) and s a (the security label of a) affect the resulting security label s. Thus, they can be accessed by attackers and used to bypass security measures such as ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization). In fact, this kind of information leaks is out of scope for our analysis since addresses of variables are not secret inputs of programs. Furthermore, mapping any security label s other than public to the l-value of variables id would taint all data accessed through dereferences of id, causing a label creep problem [10] .
Instructions. The semantics of instructions is presented in Figure 5 . It is a combination of dynamic monitoring and static analysis through the use of S P (c), the set of locations that may have been written by instruction c of program P . The statically computed set S P (c) is fed to the semantics whenever a call to the update operator occurs. We also introduce a new meta-variable pc to capture implicit flows. pc can be viewed as the security label of the program counter. Each time a program enters a conditional, pc is updated with the guard security label in order to reflect generated implicit flows. Therefore, evaluation of instructions occurs in a memory Γ, an execution context pc in addition to a memory M and an environment E. It produces new memories Γ and M .
For assignment a 1 = a 2 (rule Assign), the join of three security labels are mapped to the location of a 1 . First, s 1 takes into account pointer-induced flows from the l-value of a 1 . Second, s 2 considers explicit flows from the r-value of a 2 . Third, pc captures the implicit flows generated by conditionals. Additionally, assignments generate pointer-induced flows from the l-value of a 1 to the set of possibly written locations. Consequently, the update operator propagates the union of pc and s 1 to S p (a 1 = a 2 ). Assuming that x points to a variable a stored at location l a , Figure 6 illustrates the evaluation of instruction * x = 1. The security label s x (resp. pc) affects the security label of variable a in order to take into account pointer-induced flows (resp. implicit flows). Finally, the update operator propagates the security label s to the set S P ( * x = 1) to capture pointer-induced flows due to the assignment * x = 1.
For conditionals (rules If tt and If f f ), a new context of execution pc takes into account implicit flows generated by the conditional guard a. When a is evaluated to true (rule If tt , the other one is symmetrical), the resulting security environment takes into account the implicit flows induced by both the executed branch c 1 and the non-executed one c 2 . Implicit flows in c 1 
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Soundness. In order to formalize TINI, Definition 1 introduces an equivalence relation for memories: two memories M 1 and M 2 are s-equivalent if they are equal for the set of locations l whose label Γ(l) is at most s.
Definition 1 (Equivalence relation
Non-interference, by Definition 2, ensures that an attacker knowing only inputs and outputs up to a security level s cannot gain any knowledge of inputs whose security levels are higher than s.
Definition 2 (Termination-insensitive non-interference)
This definition of non-interference is termination-insensitive since it ignores behaviors of diverging runs, including information leaks due to the attacker ability to observe (non-)termination of programs. Definition 2 is equivalent to the definitions of TINI in the literature [3, 4, 6, 11] . Moreover, our definition of non-interference is equivalent to what Askarov et al. [4] call batch job TINI, since attackers are not allowed to know intermediate results of computation through outputs.
Theorem 1 (Soundness) The information flow-extended semantics is sound with respect to termination-insensitive non-interference as defined in 2.
Theorem 1 proves that our monitor semantics is sound with respect to TINI 1 . The proof, by induction on instructions evaluation ⇒, relies on the fact that both l-value and r-value evaluations of expressions in s-equivalent memories yield the same result for expressions whose label is below s. This theorem also proves that attackers cannot learn information by observing the behavior of our monitor since it ensures that both output security memories are equal.
Program Transformation
This section presents an inlining approach for our monitoring semantics as a program transformation. This approach has the benefits of enabling both static and dynamic analysis since both analyses can be considered depending on the required level of confidence. The former would focus on soundness by ensuring that all execution paths of the analysed program are secure. The latter would emphasize on permissiveness by enforcing non-interference for the execution path of a single run.
Informally, the program transformation maps a shadow variable -a security label-to each variable of V ar(P ), the set of variables of the initial program P . Inlining our monitor then consists of propagating those security labels with respect to the monitor semantics. For this reason, types of our language are extended with a type τ s representing security labels. Expressions are extended with security labels denoted s and a join operator on security labels. The range of memories M is also extended to V ∪ S.
In order to handle pointers, we introduce in Definitions 3 and 4 the depth D(id) of a variable id and a bijection Λ(id, k), with k ∈ [0, D(id)]. D(id) is the number of dereferences such that * D(id) id yields a basic type κ, whereas Λ maps each initial variable id to D(id) different shadow variables. Basically, * k Λ(id, k) is the security label of * k id.
Definition 3 (Depth D(x) of variable x)
Let τ x be the type of variable x ∈ V ar(P ).
We extend Λ to all l-value expressions (Λ(
Hence Λ( * k id, 0) also captures the security label of * k id. Our program transformation, denoted T , maintains a pointer-related invariant in order to correctly handle aliasing. Essentially, if x points to an integer variable a, shadow variable Λ(x, 1) also points to Λ(a, 0). This way, whenever we read (or write) the same integer through * x or a, we also read (or write) the same security label through either * Λ(x, 1) or Λ(a, 0). 
As in Definition 5, two expressions are aliased in memory M if their l-value evaluation yields the same location. Hence, the aliasing invariant, stated as Lemma 1, ensures that two l-value expressions are aliased iff their shadow variables are aliased.
Definition 5 (Aliasing equivalence relation
Transformation T relies on Definition 6 of operators L L , L R and L which express security labels of expressions in terms of shadow variables. They respectively capture the label of the l-value of a, the label of the r-value of a, and Γ(l a ), where l a is the location of a. They accurately reproduce the monitoring semantics for expressions as defined in Figure 3 .
The l-values of a variable id is associated with the security label public (rule
, the security label associated to the l-value * a, is defined as L R (a), the security label associated to the r-value of a (rule LV M EM ). As for r-values (rule RV CON ST ), the security label of constant integers L R (n) is defined as public. The security label of r-values expressions L R (a) is defined as the join of their l-value label L L (a) and the label of their content L(a) (rule RV ) in order to take into account both pointer-induced and explicit flows. L R (&a), the label of r-value expressions &a is defined as L L (a), the label of the l-value
and L R (a 1 bop a 2 ) are respectively defined according to rules RV U OP and RV BOP . Finally, the label L(a) associated to the content of a is defined as Λ(a, 0), which represents Γ(l a ) in the monitoring semantics. Figure 7 illustrates the computation of the label associated to a r-value * x. Intuitively, for the transformation to be correct, we must ensure that the evaluation of Λ(x, 0) and * Λ(x, 1) in M respectively results in s x = Γ(l x ) and s a = Γ(l a ).
Figure 7: An example of security label computation by both semantics and transformation T . We present the program transformation rules in Figure 8 . For brevity, c k ; ∀k ∈ [0, n] denotes the sequence of instructions c 0 ; c 1 ; . . . c n . Since the transformation T must maintain the execution context and must propagate it to all possibly written locations in non-executed branches, it creates for each conditional and loop a new shadow variable of type τ s , denoted pc . Variable pc captures the new execution context pc defined in the semantics. The transformation then parameterizes the branches with the new shadow variable pc . It also uses the inverse of environment E, denoted E −1 , in order to find the set of variables corresponding to the locations l ∈ S P (c). Then it propagates the execution context pc to all the corresponding shadow variables. This way, the program transformation reproduces the semantics of the update operator for conditionals and loops. Note that E −1 is well defined since each location has only one corresponding declared variable. We are confident that even for further extensions including dynamically allocated locations, we should be able to find a corresponding shadow expression if there is an expression pointing to that location. For assignments a 1 = a 2 , the program transformation propagates three security labels to the shadow expression of a 1 according the monitor semantics. Since assignments create new aliasing relations, transformation T also generates D(a 1 ) assignments to maintain the aliasing invariant stated in Lemma 1. Finally, T uses E −1 and Λ to find shadow variables corresponding to locations in S P (c) and taints them with the security label L L (a 1 ) pc.
The transformed program T (P ) is behaviourally equivalent to the initial program P . Let E| var(P ) (resp. M | Loc(P ) and Γ| Loc(P ) ) be the restriction of environment E (resp. of memory M and Γ) to the set V ar(P ) of initial variables (resp. to the set Loc(P ) of initial locations). More precisely, Theorem 2 states that for any terminating run, executions of P and T (P ) in equal input memories for initial locations Loc(P ) result in equal memories for those same locations. The proof by induction on instructions evaluation relies on the fact that program transformation T introduces only assignments handling shadow variables. Hence, those additional assignments do not modify neither values nor security labels associated to the set Loc(P ) of initial locations.
Theorem 2 (Initial semantics preservation)
For all c, E, M, Γ, pc, pc such that:
Theorem 3 proves the soundness of the transformation T with respect to the monitor semantics presented in Figure 5 . Informally, the theorem supposes that values of shadow variables (resp. execution context variable pc) are initialized according to the initial security memory Γ (resp. execution context pc). Then after the execution of the transformed instructions, it states that the values of shadow variables capture the exact values of the output security memory.
Theorem 3 (Sound monitoring of information flows) Let c, for all
Let us define the predicate
The following result holds: Υ(E, M, Γ) and E pc, M ⇒ pc =⇒ Υ(E, M , Γ ).
As the program transformation is sound with respect to our information flow monitor semantics, it is also sound wrt. TINI. Therefore, we can soundly reason about information flows through security labels defined by this program transformation. To our knowledge, that is the first proof of soundness for inlining information flow monitors handling pointers with aliasing. The proof, by induction on instructions evaluation ⇒, heavily relies on the aliasing invariant stated in Lemma 1. Figure 9 shows that the program transformation T can be used to verify TINI through both dynamic and static analysis. Assuming the implementation of security labels and their join operator, running the self-monitoring program T (P ) enforces TINI dynamically -actually, this is a hybrid approach since the monitor relies on a prior static analysis S Pfor single execution paths. This dynamic approach has the advantage of being permissive since it ignores possible unsecure paths that are not executed. It also enables dynamic loading of security policies [12] , taking into account eventual updates. The transformation T also enables the verification of TINI by static analysis: for instance, off-the-shelf abstract interpretation tools can compute an over-approximation of T (P ) semantics for all execution paths, without implementing new abstract domains. While still being more permissive than traditional type systems, such an approach freezes the enforced security policy. Yet, it enhances our confidence in the analyzed program. It also completely lifts the burden of runtime overhead.
TINI verification.

Related Work
Information flow monitors. Le Guernic et al. [7] formalize a sound flow-sensitive monitor for a simple imperative language with outputs. Le Guernic's monitor combines both static and dynamic analysis in order to enforce TINI. It is based on edit automata [13] , which are monitors enforcing a security policy by modifying program actions, namely changing secret outputs to Russo and Sabelfeld [5] parameterize their hybrid monitor for a simple imperative language by different enforcement actions (default, failstop or suppress). They also prove the necessity to rely on static analysis to soundly monitor information flows while still being more permissive than Hunt-Sands-style [3] flow-sensitive type systems. Unlike monitors based on Russo and Sabelfeld's one, we use a big-step semantics. Hence, we neither need to maintain a stack of security labels for execution contexts, nor insert instructions to notify the monitor at the immediate postdominator of each conditional.
Moore and Chong [14] extend the VM-like monitor of Russo and Sabelfeld with dynamically allocated references, allowing different sound memory abstractions. In our semantics, we use the most precise instantiation of their memory abstraction where each concrete location correspond to one abstract location. While it is undecidable in the general case to determine which locations might be updated by an instruction, we argue that, for the sake of permissiveness, it is necessary to be as precise as possible at least for the set of finite statically allocated locations.
Austin and Flanagan [11] investigate a purely dynamic monitor for a λ-calculus language with references. Their monitor supports a limited flow-sensitivity since it implements a conservative no-sensitive upgrade policy; the monitor stops the execution when assigning a public variable in a secret context. Thus, their monitor is proven sound without having to rely on static analyses. Austin and Flanagan [15] also enhance their monitor by a permissive-upgrade approach; their monitor labels public data that is assigned in secret contexts as partially leaked, then soundly forbid branching on those data. Our monitor is fully flow-sensitive, hence more permissive.
Sound inlining. Chudnov and Naumann [16] design a sound monitor inlining approach based on Russo and Sabelfeld's monitor. As they aim at monitoring information flows for Javascript, they argue that VM monitors are impractical because of just-in-time compilation. Their language supports output instructions but no references. We also believe that inlining is necessary when the language is compiled rather than interpreted.
Magazinius et al. [17] investigate sound inlining of security monitors for an imperative language supporting dynamic code evaluation but no references. Their monitor is purely dynamic since it uses a no-sensitive upgrade policy as in Austin and Flanagan [11] . Our program transformation approach can also be applied for such a policy in order to soundly monitor information flows for richer languages, including pointers.
Conclusion and future work
We have formalized a sound flow-sensitive information flow monitor handling pointers and aliasing. We have also inlined our monitor through a program transformation proven sound with respect to our monitor semantics, hence with TINI. Our program transformation enables permissive yet sound enforcement of TINI by both dynamic and static analyses. Our monitor semantics ignores diverging runs since it is inspired by a simple version of the Clight big-step semantics stripped of coinduction [8] . As pointed by Le Guernic [7] , this is not problematic when dealing with TINI because we ignore non-termination covert channels.
As we aim to support a large subset of the C language, we plan on extending both the semantics and the program transformation with richer C constructs. We are currently implementing our program transformation as a Frama-C plug-in, an open-source tool for modular analysis of C programs [18] . Frama-C enables the design of powerful analyses relying on the collaboration of off-the-shelf plug-ins. We are going to rely on Value Analysis [19] , an abstract interpretation plug-in of Frama-C, in order to compute a correct approximation S P (c), of the set of locations that might be updated by an instruction c. Frama-C also supports ACSL [20] , a formal specification language for C programs. This language can allow us to handle declassification annotations.
We prove that our monitor is sound with respect to TINI. We take advantage of the symmetry of both runs by introducing a partial order relation 7 on security memories Γ. Definition 8 is equivalent to Definition 2 when both input security memories and both execution contexts are equal in both runs.
Definition 7 (Less restrictive up to label s (
We introduce Lemma 2, which proves that for two s-equivalent memories, if the l-value evaluation of an expression yields a label below s, then it is evaluated to the same location in the second run, and to a label that is less restrictive than the label of the first run. Corollary 1 generalizes the result of Lemma 2 to include all expressions.
Lemma 2 (L-value evaluation in s-equivalent memories)
For all E, M 1 , M 2 , Γ 1 , Γ 2 , s ∈ S, such that Γ 2 s Γ 1 and M 1 ∼ s Γ1 M 2 , for all a ∈ Exp such that E a, M 1 , Γ 1 ⇐ l 1 , s 1 and E a, M 2 , Γ 2 ⇐ l 2 ,LVMEM RV (1)E a, M 1 , Γ 1 ⇐ l a , s l M 1 (l a ) = ptr(l 1 ) Γ 1 (l a ) = s r s 1 = s l s r E a, M 1 , Γ 1 ⇒ ptr(l 1 ), s 1 E * a, M 1 , Γ 1 ⇐ l 1 , s 1 LVMEM RV E a, M 2 , Γ 2 ⇐ l a , s l M 2 (l a ) = ptr(l 2 ) Γ 2 (l a ) = s r s 2 = s l s r E a, M 2 , Γ 2 ⇒ ptr(l 2 ), s 2 E * a, M 2 , Γ 2 ⇐ l 2 ,s 2 Suffices Assume: s 1 s Prove: 1. s 2 s 1 2. l 2 = l 1 2 1. s l s and s r s 3 1
Corollary 1 (R-value evaluation in s-equivalent memories)
For
Proof:
By induction on r-value evaluations, using lemma 2.
Theorem 1 proves the soundness of our semantics with respect to TINI.
Theorem 1 (Soundness) The information flow-extended semantics is sound with respect to termination-insensitive non-interference as defined in 2.
Proof: By induction on the evaluation of instructions.
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Suffices Assume:
Proof sketch: In this case, the same location l 1 = l 1 is modified by the assignment a 1 = a 2 for both runs. It suffices to consider two cases:
• l = l 1 : the initial values mapped to l are modified in both runs. Yet, the same values are mapped to l after the execution of the assignment since its output security label is below s • l = l 1 : only the security label of l is modified by the update operator. Yet, it is still below s for both runs. 
Proof: By Γ 2 (l) = pc 2 Γ 2 (l) and Γ 1 (l) = pc 1 Γ 1 (l) and 3 4 and 3 3. 
Proof sketch: By induction on instructions evaluation ⇒, knowing that the instructions added by transformation T handle only shadow variables.
Locations pointed by shadow variables are disjoint from initial locations Loc(P ) Proof: Let: 
a 1 = a 2 ; Let: c T be the instructions added by the transformation T , and
Proof: By 1 1, c T does not modify neither values nor security labels mapped by M, Γ for locations l ∈ Loc(P ). Hence, output memories M T , Γ T are equal to initial memories M, Γ when both pairs are restricted to the set of initial locations Loc(P ). 2 2. Q.E.D. Proof: By 2 1, and since instruction a 1 = a 2 handles only locations in Loc(P ), output memories are equal when restricted to Loc(P ).
Inria
4. Case: If tt
Supposing that the conditional guard is evaluated to true, evaluation of instruction if (a) c 1 else c 2 in M | Loc(P ) , Γ| Loc(P ) yield:
Transformation T maps the initial conditional to the following instructions :
} The same branch is executed for both runs since a is evaluated to the same value (assumed to be true).
Proof: By induction on the evaluation of both Evaluation of while (a) c yields:
Transformation T yields the following instructions :
